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Limiting Application of INA § 241(a)(5) after
Fernandez-Vargas v Gonzales
ClaireHausmant

On April 1, 1997 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") 1 became effective and
established sweeping changes to U.S. immigration law. Part of
the legislation involved streamlining and expediting the existing
removal procedures of illegal aliens that had become "cumbersome and duplicative." 2 Among the provisions affected by IIRIRA
was one governing the reinstatement of removal orders of aliens
who reenter the United States illegally. 3 By replacing Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 242(f), 8 USC 1252(f) (repealed 1996) 4 with § 241(a)(5), 8 USC § 1231(a)(5), the IIRIRA
expanded the category of illegal reentrants subject to reinstatement of a prior removal order, eliminated the possibility of avoiding removal order reinstatement by obtaining discretionary relief, and allowed immigration officials, instead of judges, to make
all necessary determinations concerning the decision to recom5
mence removal.
After April 1, 1997 the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")6 began applying the new reinstatement provision,
t B.A. 2003, Brown University; J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Chicago.
1 Pub L No 104-208 through 104-231, 110 Stat 3009-546 through 110 Stat 3054
(1996), codified at 8 USC § 1101 et seq and 5 USC § 552 note et seq (1996).
2 Ojeda-Terrazasv Ashcroft, 290 F3d 292, 296 (5th Cir 2002), citing Immigration in
the National Interest Act of 1995, HR Rep No 104-469, 104th Cong, 2d Sess Part 1, Section 2 at 107 (1996).
3 IIRIRA refers to "removal" which was formerly known as "deportation." See Gerald
L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum L
Rev 961, 966 (1998). ("IIRIRA realigned the vocabulary of immigration law, creating a
new category of 'removal' proceedings that largely replaces what were formerly exclusion
proceedings and deportation proceedings."). The use of each will depend on whether the
old or new scheme is referenced.
4 Courts usually observe a standard of referring to immigration statutes by their
INA and IIRIRA section numbers. This Comment will follow that standard, but include
an initial cross-reference to section numbers in the United States Code.
5 Arevalo v Ashcroft, 344 F3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir 2003).
6 Congress abolished the INS as an independent agency within the Department of
Justice and transferred its functions to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS").
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§ 241(a)(5), to aliens who had been ordered deported, and then
reentered the United States illegally, before the effective date of
IIRIRA. These aliens challenged the reinstatement of their deportation orders in the Courts of Appeals, arguing that it was
impermissibly retroactive to apply § 241(a)(5) to aliens who reentered the United States illegally before the provision's effective
date. 7 The circuits split on the issue. On June 22, 2006, in Fernandez-Vargas v Gonzales,8 the Supreme Court resolved the disagreement in favor of the Attorney General, holding that
§ 241(a)(5) has no retroactive effect when applied to aliens who
illegally reentered the United States before IIRIRA's effective
date. 9 However, the Court expressly declined to resolve a split
among the Courts of Appeals on whether an alien's marriage or
application for adjustment of status before the statute's effective
date renders the statute impermissibly retroactive when applied
to that alien.' 0
This Comment will address the limits of the application of
§ 241(a)(5) to illegal reentrants by examining the question the
Supreme Court left open in Fernandez-Vargas. It will use the
two-step test set out by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v USI
Film Products,1 ' to analyze whether reinstating the deportation
order of an alien who made efforts to legalize his status before
the statute's effective date is impermissibly retroactive. Since the
Supreme Court ruled in Fernandez-Vargasthat Congress did not
clearly indicate in § 241(a)(5) an intention for the law to have a
See Homeland Security Act, Pub L 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat 2135, 2205, codified at 6 USC
§ 291(a) (2004). The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") was created as a branch of DHS in March 2003 and is composed of the former INS and U.S. Customs Service. The detention, removal, enforcement, and investigative function, as well as
the power to adjudicate asylum claims, of the former INS now resides in ICE. See 6 USC
§ 252 (2004). For further details on ICE, see The U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement website, available at <http://www.ice.gov/> (last visited April 4, 2007).
7 See Fernandez-Vargas v Ashcroft, 394 F3d 881, 883 (10th Cir 2005); FaizMohammad v Ashcroft, 395 F3d 799, 801 (7th Cir 2005); Dinnall v Gonzales, 421 F3d 247,
249-50 (3d Cir 2005); Sarmiento Cisneros v United States Attorney General, 381 F3d
1277, 1278 (11th Cir 2004); Arevalo, 344 F3d at 12; Avila-Macias v Ashcroft, 328 F3d 108,
114 (3d Cir 2003); Ojeda-Terrazas,290 F3d at 296; Alvarez-Portillo v Ashcroft, 280 F3d
858, 862 (8th Cir 2002); Velasquez-Gabriel v Crocetti, 263 F3d 102, 107 (4th Cir 2001).
8 126 S Ct 2422 (2006).
9 See id at 2425.
10 Id at 2427 n 5.
11 See Landgraf v USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 280 (1994). The first step is to
determine "whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach." If the
statute contains no express prescription, the court's second step is to determine "whether
the new statute would have a retroactive effect" in the disfavored sense of "impair[ing]
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase[ing] a party's liability for past conduct,
or impos[ing] new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id.
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retroactive effect, 12 this Comment will focus on the second step of
the Landgraftest, determining if the law has a disfavored retroactive effect when applied to aliens who attempted to adjust their
status before IIRIRA went into effect. Part I will describe retroactivity analysis as defined by the Supreme Court. It will also
address the effect of Fernandez-Vargas on the interpretation of
§ 241(a)(5), and the current split in the Courts of Appeals. Part II
will evaluate the arguments of the Courts of Appeals by comparing the situation of illegal reentrants to other parties who have
challenged retroactive application of laws. The Comment concludes that although applying § 241(a)(5) to aliens who filed for
adjustment of status before the effective date may not create new
consequences for past acts, it is still impermissibly retroactive
under the second step of the Landgraf test because it cancels
vested rights.
I. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF § 241 (A)(5):
NOT EVERY ILLEGAL REENTRANT IS THE SAME
A.

Retroactive Application of Statutes

It is generally understood that "retroactive statutes raise
particular concerns." 13 "In a free, dynamic society, creativity in
both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of
law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of
their actions. 1 4 Furthermore, "[e]lementary considerations of
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to
know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly."1 5 For these reasons, "the presumption against retroactive
legislation is deeply rooted in [American] jurisprudence." 16 This
antiretroactivity principle is expressed in several provisions of
the Constitution, including the Ex Post Facto Clause,1 7 the Takings Clause,18 and the prohibition on Bills of Attainder. 19 How12 Fernandez-Vargas,126 S Ct at 2430 ("[1]t is just too hard to infer any clear intention ... from what is now § 241(a)(5).").
13 Landgrafv USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 266 (1994).
14 Id at 265-66.
15 Id at 265.
16 Id.

17 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 3 and Art I, § 10, cl 1 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be
passed.").
18 US Const Amend V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
19 US Const Art I, §§ 9-10 ("No Bill of Attainder... shall be passed."). See also Landgraf, 511 US at 266.
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ever, courts will not prohibit civil legislation such as § 241(a)(5),
which does not violate any of these provisions of the Constitution, from applying retroactively simply because of potential unfairness. 20 As the Supreme Court has explained, "retroactive civil
legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a
statute its intended scope." 2 1 "[B]enign and legitimate purposes"
of retroactive provisions include "respond[ing] to emergencies,
... correct[ing] mistakes, ... prevent[ing] circumvention of a
new statute in the interval immediately preceding its passage, or
simply ...giv[ing] comprehensive effect to a new law Congress
22
considers salutary."
Therefore, the courts' focus in considering the temporal
scope of civil legislation is rarely whether retroactive application
is constitutionally prohibited, 23 but rather whether Congress intended the legislation to be retroactive. Because "[r]etroactivity
is not favored in the law ...congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result."24 The requirement
that Congress make a statement of clear intent helps guarantee
that Congress balanced the benefits of retroactivity against its
potential for disruption or unfairness, and affirmatively determined retroactivity was warranted. 25 The "fundamental policy
judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes" are
therefore assigned to Congress, not the courts. 26 For example, a
court cannot designate a retroactive effect to a statute simply
because it believes doing so would more fully carry out the purpose of the law.27 Since Congress rarely writes statutes addressing a single goal, and compromises made to get a bill passed of20 See Landgraf, 511 US at 267.
21 Id. Further, the Court has held that deportation (now called removal) is not punishment. See Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698, 730 (1893) (holding that deportation is not punishment); Wong Wing v United States, 163 US 228, 236-37 (1896) (reaffirming that deportation is not punishment and holding that criminal procedural protections do not apply in deportation proceedings unless the government seeks another remedy in addition to deportation). It is only in the criminal context that ex post facto laws
are strictly prohibited, so courts have discretion in determining the scope of retroactive
application of removal statutes because removal is classified as a civil remedy.
22 Landgraf,511 US at 268.
23 However, civil penalties may raise constitutional questions. See id at 281 (teaching
that retroactive imposition of punitive damages raises a serious constitutional question
because of its similarity to criminal sanctions).
24 Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US 204, 208 (1988).
25 See Landgraf,511 US at 268.
26 Id at 273.
27 See id at 285-86.
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ten necessitate resorting to means other than those that might
most directly pursue the particular goals, a retroactive intent
cannot be inferred by the courts. 28 Congress legislates against
the "predictable background rule" of a presumption against retroactivity, so a court's loosening of this presumption would risk
29
improperly countering congressional intent.
The landmark case Landgraf v USI Film Products30 sets out
a two step test for determining whether civil legislation may operate retroactively. A statute may be applied retroactively if
Congress clearly indicates in the language of the legislation that
it intends the law to have such a result. 31 Therefore, the first
step of the Landgraf test asks whether "Congress has expressly
prescribed the statute's proper reach." 32 To determine a statute's
temporal reach, courts use normal rules of statutory construction. 33 The standard is a demanding one as Congress's intent
must be clear for a statute to apply in a disfavored, retroactive
34
way.
If nothing in a statute evidences the unambiguous intent for
a specific provision to apply retroactively, then in the second
step, the court must consider whether its application in the case
at hand would have retroactive effects. 35 If the provision of the
statute has a retroactive effect, then the court presumes it will
not apply to the conduct in question in the case, which occurred
prior to its effective date. 36 If the court determines there is no
retroactive effect, then the statute's application is not barred.
This outcome results from the presumption against retroactivity.
If Congress has not overcome that presumption by expressing
intent for a retroactive effect, then neither an agency nor a court
28 Id at 286.

29 See Landgraf,511 US at 273.
30 511 US 244 (1994).

31 INS v St Cyr, 533 US 289, 316 (2001).
32 Landgraf,511 US at 280.
33 Lindh v Murphy, 521 US 320, 326 (1997).
34 See id at 328 (noting that "Congress could have taken [the Landgrafopinion] as
counseling the wisdom of being explicit it if wanted such a provision to be applied to cases
already pending').
35 See Martin v Hadix, 527 US 343, 357 (1999) ("Because we conclude Congress has
not 'expressly prescribed' the proper reach of [the statute], we must determine whether
application of this section in this case would have retroactive effects inconsistent with the
usual rule that legislation is deemed to be prospective." (citation omitted)).
36 See, for example, Hughes Aircraft Company v United States, 520 US 939, 946
(1997) ('The principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under
the law that existed when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal."
(quotation and citation omitted)).
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can stretch the scope of the statute by applying it to past actions.
Such an application is unlawful because it is inconsistent with
presumed congressional intent.
Unfortunately, the boundaries defining retroactive application are not exact. Retroactive effects may include "impair[ing]
rights a party possessed when he acted, increas[ing] a party's
liability for past conduct, or impos[ing] new duties with respect
to transactions already completed." 3 7 However, a statute does not
operate retroactively "merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment ...or upsets expectations based in prior law." 38 The Supreme Court has
not concretely defined the outer limit of impermissible retroactivity. 39 It has stated that deciding when a statute operates retroac40
tively is "not always a simple or mechanical task."
In a line of cases, the Court has described effects that constitute sufficient, if not necessary, conditions for invoking the presumption against retroactivity. 4 1 Landgrafrelied on a traditional
standard put forth by Justice Story that asks whether a statute
"takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing
laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past."42 Though the Court's standards for evaluating retroactive effects have varied slightly, 43 generally, the "inquiry into whether a statute operates retroactively demands a
commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. ' 44 The Court has repeatedly explained that
the judgment "should be informed and guided by 'familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expec45
tations."'
37 Landgraf, 511 US at 280.
38 Id at 269 (citation omitted).
39 See Hughes Aircraft Co, 520 US at 947 (clarifying that Landgraf did not "define
the outer limit of impermissible retroactivity").
40 Landgraf, 511 US at 268.
41 Hughes Aircraft Co, 520 US at 947.
42 Landgraf, 511 US at 269, quoting Society for Propagationof the Gospel v Wheeler,
22 F Cas 756, 767, 2 Gall 105 (1814). The Court later rephrased this standard as whether
the statute would "impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Landgraf,511 US at 280.
43 Hughes Aircraft Co, 520 US at 947.
44 Martin, 527 US at 357-58 (quotation and citation omitted).
45 St Cyr, 533 US at 321, quoting Martin, 527 US at 358. See also Landgraf, 511 US
at 270.
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The LandgrafTest Applied to IIRIRA

The Supreme Court applied the Landgraf test to determine
whether provisions in IIRIRA applied retroactively, first in INS v
St Cyr,46 and recently in Fernandez-Vargasv Gonzales.47 During
March 1996, St. Cyr, a lawful permanent resident entered a
guilty plea of selling a controlled substance. 48 Under the preIIRIRA law, he became subject to deportation but was also eligible for a discretionary waiver of that deportation because his
sentence did not exceed five years. 49 However, removal proceedings against him were not commenced until after IIRIRA had
become effective, leading the Attorney General to argue that under the new statute he no longer had discretion to grant such a
waiver. 50 The Court held that the elimination of any possibility of
relief by IIRIRA would have an "obvious and severe retroactive
effect" on St. Cyr and other aliens like him. 5 1 The statute's application failed the second step of the Landgraf test because St. Cyr
almost certainly relied upon the likelihood of a waiver of deportation in deciding whether to forgo his right to a trial. Eliminating
the possibility of that waiver would have had an impermissible
retroactive effect because it attached a new disability (removing
any chance for discretionary relief from deportation) resulting
from his plea, which was a past transaction. 52 In so holding, the
Court stressed the unimportance that the relief available to St.
Cyr pre-IIRIRA was discretionary. The Court explained that because "[t]here is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation" the elimination of any possibility of relief by
IIRIRA was impermissible in the case because of its retroactive
53
effect.
46 533 US 289 (2001).
47 126 S Ct 2422 (2006).
48 See St Cyr, 533 US at 314.
49 See id at 295-96 n 4, 314-15. See also INA § 212(c), 8 USC 1182(c) (1994).
50 See St Cyr, 533 US at 293.
51 Id at 325.

Prior to . . . IIRIRA, aliens like St. Cyr had a significant likelihood of receiving
§212(c) relief. Because respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly
relied upon that likelihood in deciding whether to forgo their right to a trial, the
elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by IIRIRA has an obvious and severe retroactive effect.
Id.
52 Id.

53 St Cyr, 533 US at 325.
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The Court in Fernandez-Vargasalso addressed the temporal
scope of an IIRIRA provision, but found no retroactive effect.
Since 1950, Congress has allowed for the reinstatement of orders
removing some aliens who either voluntarily left in the face of a
deportation order or were deported, and then unlawfully reentered the country, to facilitate their expedited removal. 54 Prior to
IIRIRA, the class of illegal reentrants susceptible to reinstatement was limited to aliens who were deported for enumerated
reasons. 55 Moreover, statutes such as 8 USC § 1254(a)(1) allowed
for discretionary relief from reinstated orders of deportation.5 6 In
1996 these laws were replaced as part of IIRIRA. The new section governing reinstatement provides:
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered
the United States illegally after having been removed or
having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal,
the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original
date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the
alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under
this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the
57
prior order at any time after the reentry.
After § 241(a)(5) took effect on April 1, 1997, Courts of Appeals were confronted with the issue of whether the provision
applied to illegal aliens who reentered before that date. Two circuits held that § 241(a)(5) did not apply to aliens who reentered
before the provision's effective date 58 but a majority held that it
59
did, at least in some circumstances.
54 See Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S Ct at 2425-26.
55 See 8 USC § 1252(f) (1995) (for example criminal conviction).
56 8 USC 1254(a)(1) (1995).
57 INA § 241(a)(5), 8 USC § 1231(a)(5).
58 See Castro-Cortezv INS, 239 F3d 1037, 1050 (9th Cir 2001), overruled by Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S Ct at 2427 & n 5 ("[W]e agree... that ...INA §241(a)(5) ...does not
apply retroactively to aliens who reentered the United States before IIRIRA's effective
date."); Bejani v INS, 271 F3d 670, 684 (6th Cir 2001) overruled by Fernandez-Vargas,
126 S Ct at 2427 & n 5 ("We agree with the Ninth Circuit that the complete elimination of
the retroactive language from the reinstatement provision is persuasive evidence that
Congress did not intend for the new reinstatement provision to apply to reentries which
occurred prior to the statute's effective date.").
59 See Fernandez-Vargas vAshcroft, 394 F3d 881, 890 (10th Cir 2005):
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in St. Cyr, we agree with the reasoning
of the majority of circuits and join them in holding that Congress's failure to expressly state that the reinstatement statute applied to aliens who re-entered
the country prior to its effective date, does not mean that Congress therefore
unambiguously intended for the statute not to apply to these aliens.
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The Court resolved the split in Fernandez-Vargas in favor of
the majority of Courts of Appeals. The Court held that the new
version of the reinstatement provision could apply to individuals
who illegally reentered the United States before IIRIRA's effec60
tive date and failed to make any effort to adjust their status.
Fernandez-Vargas was a Mexican citizen who was deported and
reentered the U.S. illegally before IIRIRA became effective. In
1989, an American citizen with whom he was romantically involved gave birth to their son, also an American citizen. In 2001
the couple married, and Fernandez-Vargas later filed an application to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident. This application brought his illegal presence to the attention of the authorities, and in 2003 the Government began proceedings under
§ 241(a)(5) that led to "reinstating Fernandez-Vargas's 1981 deportation order, but without the possibility of adjusting his
61
status to lawful residence."
Fernandez-Vargas's petition for review of the reinstatement
order eventually landed before the Supreme Court. The Court
first concluded that Congress failed to expressly state the temporal reach of the INA's reinstatement provision. Further, its attempts to parse the language and structure did not clarify Congress's intention. 62 Therefore, the Court found that step one of
the Landgraftest supported the presumption against retroactivity. Considering step two of the Landgraf test, the Court noted
two reasons for its finding that applying § 241(a)(5), and denying
Fernandez-Vargas the opportunity for adjustment of status as
the spouse of a citizen of the United States, created no retroac-

Id; Faiz-Mohammad v Ashcroft, 395 F3d 799, 804 (7th Cir 2005) ("[T]he majority of circuits have taken the approach most consistent with the Supreme Court's view."); Sarmiento Cisneros v United States Attorney General, 381 F3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir 2004)
(reasoning the section could be applied, but in petitioner's case it would have an impermissible retroactive effect); Arevalo v Ashcroft, 344 F3d 1, 12-15 (1st Cir 2003) (same);
Avila-Macias v Ashcroft, 328 F3d 108, 114 (3d Cir 2003) (relying on the reasoning of the
majority of circuits); Ojeda-Terrazas v Ashcroft, 290 F3d 292, 302 (5th Cir 2002) (holding
§ 241(a)(5) did not have an impermissibily retroactive effect, and was properly applied to
the alien in that case); Alvarez-Portillo v Ashcroft, 280 F3d 858, 865 (8th Cir 2002) (determining that finding any retroactive effect would not make the entire statute inapplicable to someone in petitioner's position); Velasquez-Gabriel v Crocetti, 263 F3d 102, 107
(4th Cir 2001) (deciding application was not impermissibly retroactive in this case). See
also Sarmiento Cisneros v United States Attorney General, 381 F3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir
2004) (implying application to aliens who applied for relief after enactment of the statute,
but who had reentered before, might be permissible).
60 See Fernandez-Vargas,126 S Ct at 2427.
61 Id.

62 See id at 2429-30.
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tive effects, and therefore was lawful. 63 First, the Court found
that the text of the provision "applies to Fernandez-Vargas today
not because he reentered in 1982 or at any other particular time,
but because he chose to remain after the new statute became effective." 64 Because it was his choice to continue his illegal presence after the effective date of the new law, and not a past act
that he was helpless to undo, which subjected him to the new
and less generous legal regime, application of the new provision
was not retroactive. 65 Second, IIRIRA became law on September
30, 1996 but had a provision setting its effective date as April 1,
1997.66 Despite ample warning of the coming change of the law,
Fernandez-Vargas chose to remain until the old law was repealed and replaced by § 241(a)(5) when he could have avoided
the new law by returning to Mexico. The Court therefore found
that the Attorney General was free to apply § 241(a)(5).
Circuit Split Over Application of § 241(a)(5)

C.

The Supreme Court's ruling only resolved the application of
§ 241(a)(5) in one circumstance. Fernandez-Vargas had long
maintained a relationship with a United States citizen, but did
not apply for adjustment of status to a legal permanent resident
until after they had married in 2001.67 Therefore, the Court did
not answer, and the Courts of Appeals remain split on, the question "whether an alien's marriage or application for adjustment
of status before the statute's effective date ... renders the stat68
ute impermissibly retroactive when it is applied to the alien."
While in Fernandez-Vargas the Supreme Court did not distinguish the unaddressed issues of aliens who were eligible to
apply for adjustment because of their marital status, and those
63
64
65
66

See id at 2431.
Fernandez-Vargas,126 S Ct at 2431.
Id at 2432.
Id at 2432, citing § 309(a), Pub L 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-625, codified at 8 USC

§ 1101 note (1996).
67 See Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S Ct at 2427 (Fernandez-Vargas filed an application to
adjust his status to that of lawful permanent resident under 8 USC § 1255(i). This provision allows certain aliens who entered without inspection to apply to the Attorney General for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. As Fernandez-Vargas discovered, illegal reentrants are treated differently than
aliens who entered illegally, but have not previously been deported. Even if deportation
proceedings had been brought against Fernandez-Vargas before the establishment of the
expedited removal proceedings under IIRIRA, he could have pursued adjustment of
status based on his marriage to, or parenthood of, a United States citizen as a defense to
deportation via a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(g), 8 USC § 1182(h) (1995).
68 Fernandez-Vargas,126 S Ct at 2427 n 5.

591]

LIMITING APPLICATION OF INA § 241(A)(5)

who actually did apply before IIRIRA's effective date, the Courts
of Appeals have treated the two situations differently. Both the
Fourth and Eighth Circuits have held that applying expedited
removal procedures to aliens who married United States citizens
before IIRIRA's effective date, but did not file for adjustment of
status until after, was not retroactive. 69 In Velasquez-Gabriel v
Crocetti,70 the Fourth Circuit reasoned similarly to the Court in
Fernandez-Vargas, though it heard the case before the ruling.
The petitioner married a U.S. citizen more than a year before
§ 241(a)(5) took effect, but failed to apply to adjust his status
during that time, even though he was represented by counsel
and informed of his rights under pre-IIRIRA law. 71 The court
found that he clearly had the opportunity to know the law, and
conform his conduct accordingly. Like Fernandez-Vargas, his
failure to apply to adjust his resident status before the new law
took effect "fatally undermine[d] his contention that § 241(a)(5)'s
application to him 'attaches new legal consequences to events
72
completed before its enactment."'
In Gonzalez v Chertoff,73 a case following Fernandez-Vargas,
the Eighth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's reasoning to a
petitioner who had married before IIRIRA, but applied for adjustment of status after its effective date. The court emphasized
that "it was [the petitioner's] 'choice to continue his illegal presence ...that subjected him to the new and less generous legal
regime"' and that he was not helpless to undo an act that had
new legal consequences. 74 Furthermore, between the passage of
IIRIRA and its effective date, Gonzalez could have applied for
adjustment of status based on his marriage, but failed to do so.75
Both reasons supported the court's holding that "the elimination
of the opportunity to apply for adjustment of status under the
new law imposed no new burden on a completed act"76 and thus
was not retroactive. The Eighth Circuit therefore widened the
application of the Supreme Court's holding to illegal reentrants
69 Gonzalez v Chertoff, 454 F3d 813, 818 (8th Cir 2006) (applying § 1228(b) but holding that Fernandez-Vargaswas determinative of the issue and overruling Alvarez-Portillo
which considered § 241(a)(5)); Velasquez-Gabriel, 263 F3d at 109-10 (applying
§ 241(a)(5)).
70 263 F3d 102 (4th Cir 2001).
71 Id at 109-10.
72 Id, quoting St Cyr, 533 US at 321.
73 454 F3d 813 (8th Cir 2006).
74 Id at 818, quoting Fernandez-Vargas,126 S Ct at 2432.
75 Gonzalez, 454 F3d at 818.
76 Id.
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who could have applied for adjustment of status before the effective date, but did not.
The First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, in decisions predating Fernandez-Vargas, distinguished cases of aliens who applied for adjustment of status before IIRIRA's effective date from
the "mine run" of people who appealed from the reinstatement of
previous removal orders. 77 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, in
Faiz-Mohammad v Ashcroft78 and Sarmiento Cisneros v United
States Attorney General,79 relied on the "new disability" that retroactive application of § 241(a)(5) created.8 0 Finding that
§ 241(a)(5) impaired rights the aliens had when they applied for
adjustment of status, namely their ability to apply for discretionary relief, the courts held the application was retroactive. In addition, the First Circuit relied on the "salient distinction" created
by application for discretionary relief before the effective date of
IIRIRA.8 1 The court stated that once made, these applications
82
"become a source of expectation and even reliance."

II. WHEN APPLYING § 241(A)(5) IS RETROACTIVE
The Supreme Court has already established that § 241(a)(5)
gives no indication of Congress's intent regarding retroactive effect. A difference in facts of an individual case does not change
that conclusion, because the Court read the statute generally,
not as applied. Therefore, the second step of the Landgraf test
constitutes the only analysis necessary to determine whether
§ 241(a)(5) applies retroactively to illegal reentrants that applied
for adjustment of status before IIRIRA's effective date. Since the
Court has determined Congress did not intend § 241(a)(5) to be
retroactive, any retroactive application by an immigration
agency would be unlawful.8 3 The second step of the Landgraftest
involves considering two categories of possible retroactive effects
resulting from the application of § 241(a)(5): new consequences of

77 See Arevalo, 344 F3d at 14. Accord Sarmiento Cisneros, 381 F3d at 1284-85. See
also Faiz-Mohammad, 395 F3d at 809.
78 395 F3d 799 (7th Cir 2005).
79 381 F3d 1277 (11th Cir 2004).
80 See id at 1284. See also Faiz-Mohammad, 395 F3d at 810.
81 Arevalo v Ashcroft, 344 F3d 1, 14 (1st Cir 2003).
82 Id.

83 See, for example, Martin v Hadix, 527 US 343, 352 (1999) ("If [there is retroactive
effect], then in keeping with our traditional presumption against retroactivity, we presume that the statute does not apply to that conduct." (citation and quotation omitted)).
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a past act and the impairment of vested rights acquired under
existing laws.
Application of § 241(a)(5) Does Not Create New
Consequences of a Past Act

A.

The Court's analysis in Fernandez-Vargasof why § 241(a)(5)
does not create new consequences of past acts for aliens who applied for adjustment of status after IIRIRA's effective date applies equally to aliens who applied for adjustment of status before the effective date. In considering whether a statute has retroactive effects because it creates new consequences of past acts,
a court must identify the "past act." Relying on the text of the
statute, the Court pointed out that § 241(a)(5) does not penalize
an alien for reentry, but instead establishes a process to remove
him "under the prior order at any time after the reentry. 8 4 The
Court found, therefore, that it is the "alien's choice to continue
his illegal presence, after illegal reentry and after the effective
date of the new law, that subjects him to the new and less generous legal regime, not a past act that he is helpless to undo up to
the moment the Government finds him out."8 5 Because a court
does not apply § 241(a)(5) to an act occurring before the effective
date of IIRIRA, the law creates no retroactive effects.
There is no reason why the Court would change its analysis
for an alien who had applied for adjustment of status before
IIRIRA. The Government is likewise only ending this alien's continued illegal presence in the United States by applying
§ 241(a)(5), not creating new consequences to the past act of illegal reentry. An illegal reentrant retains his illegal status even
after applying for adjustment of status. Like Fernandez-Vargas,
it is "the alien's choice to continue his illegal presence, after illegal reentry and after the effective date of the new law"8 6 that exposes him to the consequences of the new law.
Also like Fernandez-Vargas, an illegal reentrant who applied for adjustment had the same grace period between the enactment of § 241(a)(5) and its effective date when he could have
left the country and avoided the application of the new law.
Though the costs may have been harsh, this alien could have returned to his country of citizenship, waited until his applications

84

Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S Ct at 2432, quoting § 241(a)(5).

86

Id.

85 Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S Ct at 2432.
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for adjustment of status was processed, and then legally returned to the U.S. The Court recognizes that a choice to avoid
the new law before its effective date or to end the continuing violation would come at a high personal price for an alien who has
to leave a business or a family established during illegal residence, but the Court also stresses that retroactivity is meant to
"avoid new burdens imposed on completed acts, not all difficult
87
choices occasioned by new law."
Applying § 241(a)(5) to an alien who chose to apply for adjustment of status before IIRIRA's effective date does not impose
new burdens because it neither weakens his immigration status
under the new law, nor hurts his chances of ultimately remaining in the country with a regularized status. However, the Court
in St Cyr found that "converting deportation from a likely possibility to a dead certainty" would add a new disability to transactions already past, and therefore application of the new law was
barred under Landgraf's retroactivity test.8 8 The Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits considered this reasoning in holding that application of § 241(a)(5) should be barred in cases where it con89
verted deportation from a possibility to a certainty.
However, a distinction exists between St. Cyr's circumstances and those of the alien who applied for adjustment of
status before IIRIRA's effective date. St. Cyr decided to plead
guilty after weighing the opportunity for discretionary relief from
deportation under circumstances of the plea bargain against his
chances for avoiding deportation by going to trial and being
found not guilty on the drug charge. 90 After deciding that the
plea bargain was his best course of action, he pleaded guilty.
IIRIRA changed the balance of consequences by eliminating his
chance for discretionary relief after the guilty plea. But at that
point, St. Cyr could not rescind his guilty plea.
In contrast, an illegal reentrant decreases his chance for discretionary relief by applying for adjustment of status under the
new law only if he chooses to remain in the United States while
his application was pending. A court faced with a petitioner who
chose to remain in the United States could make two arguments.
One, such an alien likely would not have acted differently know87 Id at 2433.
88 Id at 2431.

89 See Sarmiento Cisneros v United States Attorney General, 381 F3d 1277, 1283-84
(11th Cir 2004). Consider Faiz-Mohammadv Ashcroft, 395 F3d 799, 810 (7th Cir 2005).
90 See St Cyr, 533 US at 321-22.
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ing that the new law would soon take effect. If an alien in this
position did not take steps to adjust his illegal status, then the
chances of reinstatement of his deportation order would have
been certain, should the INS have discovered his illegal presence
after IIRIRA's effective date. Therefore, application of § 241(a)(5)
cannot increase the burden of applying for adjustment of status,
since inaction would have meant a certain chance of deportation.
Further, relying on Fernandez-Vargas,a court could argue it was
the alien's decision to stay in the United States illegally after
applying for adjustment of status, made after the effective date
of § 241(a)(5), that prevented the possibility of discretionary relief, not his application for adjustment of status. Unlike St. Cyr,
such an alien still had an option that allowed him to retain the
same chance for discretionary relief after the new law took effect.
However, there are weaknesses to both of these arguments.
First, in practice, any filing with the government would seem to
increase the chance of removal, as it has the effect of alerting
immigration enforcement agencies to an alien's illegal presence.
Arguing otherwise ignores the reality that not every alien's illegal presence comes to the attention of immigration authorities.
In fact, Fernandez-Vargas's application to adjust his status to
that of lawful permanent resident is apparently what "tipped off"
the government to his illegal presence, causing it to begin proceedings under § 241(a)(5) to reinstate his deportation order. 9 1
Fernandez-Vargas had remained undetected in the United
States for twenty years after illegally reentering in 1982.92 Absent purposeful government contact or criminal activity, the government is unlikely to become aware of an alien's illegal presence. It seems improbable that Congress intended, under
§ 241(a)(5), to punish, with an increased chance of removal,
aliens who try to regularize their status through statutorily accepted channels, while favoring those who instead choose to illegally rely on the ease of avoiding detection. Even ignoring intent,
application of § 241(a)(5) does seem to increase the burden of applying for adjustment of status, since an alien may fail to file,
retain his illegal status, and fairly realistically assume his undetected illegal presence will allow him to avoid removal.
Second, it seems counterintuitive to argue that an alien can
only retain the hope of discretionary relief that allows him to remain in the country by leaving the country. The Court has de91 Fernandez-Vargas,126 S Ct at 2427.
Id.

92
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termined that the alien's decision to stay in the United States
illegally, after the effective date of § 241(a)(5), is the "past act"
relevant for the retroactivity consideration of whether the appli'93
cation of the statute creates "new consequences of past acts.
However, it is the application for adjustment of status filed before the amendment of the law that increases the chance of removal (by raising awareness of his illegal presence). Therefore,
arguably it is the application that should be relevant in a court's
consideration of retroactivity in the automatic reinstatement of a
deportation order. This act, like St. Cyr's guilty plea, could not be
rescinded after the enactment of § 241(a)(5) removed the possibility of obtaining discretionary relief. Since the filing for adjustment of status occurred before the effective date of § 241(a)(5),
application of the statute to this act would be retroactive, and
therefore barred.
The Eleventh Circuit in Sarmiento Cisneros made the same
argument by defining the "past act" as the application for adjustment of status made before § 241(a)(5)'s effective date. The
court contended that the retroactive application of § 241(a)(5)
would attach a new disability to a completed transaction, because the alien had already applied for discretionary relief in the
form of an adjustment of status before the effective date of
IIRIRA. 94 IIRIRA eliminates the availability of this relief, and
therefore applying § 241(a)(5) would take away an opportunity
for discretionary relief that was previously available to the
alien. 95 The Eleventh Circuit supported this assertion by stressing that an application for discretionary relief 'becomes a source
of expectation and even reliance."' 96 However, this argument disregards the Supreme Court's assertion that "[a] statute does not
operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case
arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment ... or
upsets expectations based in prior law." 97
Any detriment due to reliance on a law is not sufficient to
create a retroactive effect. The Fourth Circuit, in dicta, explained
the distinction between general detrimental reliance which
"proves nothing," and detrimental reliance for purposes of assess-

93
94
95
96
97

See id at 2432.
Sarmiento Cisneros, 381 F3d at 1284.
See id at 1285.
Id at 1284, quoting Arevalo, 344 F3d at 14.
Landgraf,511 US at 269.

591]

LIMITING APPLICATION OF INA

§ 241 (A)(5)

607

ing the retroactive effect of § 241(a)(5). 98 In Velasquez-Gabriel, an
alien who married a United States citizen before IIRIRA's effective date argued that he relied to his detriment on his ability,
under the old law, to adjust his status after they married, and
may not have married at all otherwise.9 9 The Fourth Circuit explained that the petitioner's argument was ineffective because he
"posit[ed] no way in which his marriage in 'reliance' on preexisting law weakened his immigration status under the new law or
hurt his chances of remaining in this country." 100 In other words,
reliance on an old law is relevant to the inquiry of the retroactive
effect of § 241(a)(5) only if that reliance irrevocably worsened the
alien's chances for discretionary relief under the new law. Marriage does not decrease an alien's chances of discretionary relief
under § 241(a)(5), and therefore is extraneous evidence in the
retroactive effects inquiry. That an alien married under the old
law expecting to increase his chances for regularization of status
does not create a retroactive effect; a statute does not operate
retroactively merely because it "upsets expectations based in
prior law." 10 1
However, this distinction between different types of reliance
does not explain why application of § 241(a)(5) to an illegal reentrant who applied for adjustment of status under the old law
would not create a retroactive effect. Unlike Velasquez-Gabriel,
an alien could posit a way in which his application for adjustment in reliance on preexisting law hurt his chances of remaining in this country. His application under the old law brought his
illegal presence to the attention of the government, and under
§ 241(a)(5), his only opportunity to avoid automatic reinstatement of his former deportation order is to leave the country. On
the other hand, under pre-IIRIRA law, if his adjustment of
status had tipped off immigration authorities, discretionary relief from reinstatement was still available.
In general, the confusing process of characterizing a specific
application of a statute as retroactive may point to a general
weakness of the Landgraf test's second step. The Court admits
that "[a]ny test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement
in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of

98 Velasquez-Gabriel v Crocetti, 263 F3d 102, 109 (4th Cir 2001).

99 Id.
100 Id.

101 Landgraf,511 US at 269.

608

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2007:

legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity."10 2 The Court
tries to allay fears about the vague boundaries of what qualifies
as retroactive by stating "retroactivity is a matter on which
judges tend to have sound instincts, and familiar considerations
of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer
sound guidance." 10 3 But a judge's weighing of these factors
sounds awfully similar to a balancing inquiry between a law's
purpose and private hardship that occurs in administrative law
cases after agency lawmaking has been found retroactive. This
balancing function is problematic in several ways. First, a main
goal of the Landgraf test is to avoid judicial determination of the
temporal scope of a statute.10 4 Instead, the test is meant to ensure the courts give effect to congressional intent because Congress is the branch best suited to make policy determinations
about whether the benefits of retroactive effect outweigh the
negatives of unfairness and reliance.1 0 5 Hence, in step one, if the
court finds Congress intended a retroactive effect, the inquiry is
at an end, and the court will not prohibit the retroactive application. Similarly, if in step one the court finds no indication Congress intended a retroactive effect, the presumption against retroactivity stands, and the court will prohibit any retroactive application. But the vague lines defining retroactivity cause the
courts to push the balancing of interests into step two, and make
it part of the inquiry of whether a statutory application is retroactive at all. Instead of finding an application retroactive, and
then determining whether it is a permissible retroactivity under
consideration of fairness and reliance, the Landgraf test encourages courts to perform a balancing test in order to determine
whether a statutory application will be labeled as retroactive.
The courts still end up weighing whether retroactivity is desirable, but under the guise of determining whether an application
is retroactive at all.
Second, the courts may in fact be trying to give effect to
Congress's intent in the second step of the Landgraftest, but its
description of abstract ideas such as "new consequences for past
acts" and "vested rights," which are malleable depending on context, obscure the courts' actual considerations. Though the Court
says it cannot rebut the presumption against retroactivity by
102 Id at 270.

103 Id (quotation and citation omitted).
104 See id at 273.

105 Landgraf,511 US at 272-73.
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considering the purpose of a statute, 10 6 after searching the statute and every surrounding document for intent of retroactive effect in step one, it may be difficult to counteract a purpose the
Court has come to believe Congress intended. Because step two
requires a court to strike down any retroactive application, the
Court will find the application of the statute creates no new consequences or fails to impinge on vested rights in order to avoid
contravening what it perceives as congressional intent. After all,
step one makes Congressional intent determinative of whether a
retroactive application of a statute is permissible. Completely
ignoring intent in step two entails a dissonant shift that may be
hard for courts to fully achieve.
Application of § 241(a)(5) Impairs a Vested Right

B.

Aliens who applied for adjustment of status before IIRIRA's
effective date established a vested right in discretionary relief. A
vested right is an "immediate fixed right of present or future enjoyment." 10 7 The Supreme Court noted that Fernandez-Vargas's
claim to relief in the form of adjustment of status was not a
vested right because it was contingent on "some action that
would elevate it above the level of hope."10 8 Fernandez-Vargas
never "availed himself" of forms of discretionary relief or "took an
action that enhanced their significance to him in particular."' 10 9
This reasoning suggests that aliens who applied for adjustment
of status have taken key action. By applying for adjustment of
status before the effective date they transformed "inchoate expectations" into a fixed right. Unlike Fernandez-Vargas, aliens
who applied to adjust their status before IIRIRA's effective date
had completed all of the actions necessary for an adjustment of
status; the relief was no longer contingent on any action by them,
but awaited only a discretionary decision by the Attorney General. The Court explained that the discretionary nature of this
form of relief does not affect its categorization as a vested
right. 110
The vested nature of the relief sought explains the different
treatment of illegal reentrants who had only married U.S. citizens, and those who took the further step of also applying for
106

See id at 285-86.

107 Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S Ct at 2432 n 10 (quotation and citation omitted).

108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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adjustment of status. Application for adjustment of status did
not distinguish the two groups by creating a different level of
detrimental reliance, or new consequences for past action. After
all, both groups knew they were remaining in the United States
with an illegal status after the effective date of IIRIRA, and both
could argue that they structured their lives based on their belief
that discretionary relief would be available to them. Therefore, if
new consequences were creating impermissible retroactive effects, then circuit courts would have held § 241(a)(5) could not
apply to aliens who had married before IIRIRA's effective date,
but not applied for adjustment of status.
However, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits held that it was
not impermissibly retroactive to apply § 241(a)(5) to aliens who
had only married. Aliens who had only married left their opportunity for relief contingent on their further action. They still
needed to apply for adjustment of status in order to have any
chance above "the level of hope" that they would receive relief.
In Landgraf, the Court stated that a statute which takes
away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing law describes a sufficient condition for invoking the presumption
against retroactivity. 111 Therefore, § 241(a)(5)'s elimination of the
vested right to discretionary relief through adjustment of status
is a sufficient basis for a court to rule that applying it to aliens
who applied for the relief before IIRIRA's effective date has an
unlawful retroactive effect. However, considering the Court's
enunciation that judgment about impermissible retroactivity
"should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair
notice"'112 leads to that conclusion as well. The Court's reasoning
relies on the "grace period" between the enactment of IIRIRA
and its effective date that allowed aliens to act accordingly, for
example to leave the country to avoid application of the new law.
If an alien prepared for the new law by applying for adjustment
of status, but then still has § 241(a)(5) applied to him, fair notice
was not actually given. Fair notice implies the time to do something.
Furthermore, one purpose of the vested right paradigm is
that it is undesirable for the judicial system to give different legal treatment to similar cases based on chance, or the efficiency
of executive departments. Instead, the vested right distinguishes

111
112

Hughes Aircraft Co v United States, 520 US 939, 947 (1997).
St Cyr, 533 US at 321, quoting Martin, 527 US at 358; Landgraf, 511 US at 270.
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people based on their affirmative past actions to secure rights. 1 13
Additionally, though the Court concluded that Congress did not
make clear its intended temporal scope for § 241(a)(5), the retroactivity of a statute is still fundamentally an issue of Congressional intent. Unlike the criminal context, in most instances of
civil legislation there is no explicit constitutional prohibition on
its retroactive application. It seems unlikely that Congress intended one alien be able to legally stay in the United States because his application for adjustment of status happened to be
processed before IIRIRA's effective date, while another alien who
similarly applied for adjustment of status before IIRIRA's effective date is deported under § 241(a)(5) because the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") had not processed his application yet. Congress would have no reason to give
ICE an incentive to fail to process these applications, and to just
wait out the clock until the effective date of IIRIRA, in essence
moving up the effective date. It would be counterintuitive for
Congress to intend to provide a way for an administrative agency
to undermine a provision in its statute.
CONCLUSION

This comment addresses the question left unanswered by
Fernandez-Vargas: whether applying § 241(a)(5) to illegal reentrants who applied for adjustment of status before IIRIRA's effective date would lead to retroactive effects. Conducting the
Landgraf two-step retroactivity test while considering the reasoning of Fernandez-Vargas, as well as Courts of Appeals' decisions on the issue, leads to the conclusion that, though it would
not create new consequences for completed acts, it would impair
vested rights. Since impairing a vested right is sufficient to support the presumption against retroactive application, § 241(a)(5)
may not take away the vested opportunity for discretionary relief
available to this group of aliens.

113

See Fernandez-Vargas,126 S Ct at 2432 n 10.
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